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Abstract 
 
A region’s adaptive capability describes its ability to respond positively to changes and shocks 
that affect the regional economy over time and take advantage of new and emerging market 
opportunities from wherever they arise. Central to this idea is the manner in which historic 
economic strengths or capabilities can be turned to new purposes. This paper provides a case 
study that uses the concept of adaptive capability as a lens through which to explore the 
emergence of a notable bioscience based industrial cluster in a city region of the UK and the 
part that it played in helping to restructure the economic base of the city.  
The local economy of Nottingham faced major structural changes in the late 1990s. These 
changes saw not only the demise of what had at one time been a key industrial sector, but also 
the departure of two of the city’s three principal employers, and the closure of a major research 
facility owned by a third.  The case explores the manner in which capabilities linked to this 
constellation of firms were redeployed in order to take advantage of new market opportunities. 
The case places particular emphasis on the contribution of firms, the restructuring of industry 
sectors and institutional changes that occurred at this time, to the city’s adaptive capability. In 
the process the case study reveals a notable example of adaptation as the local economy moved 
away from a previous path of regional and sectoral development, towards a new and yet related 
trajectory. Central to this process was the purposive re-tasking of physical assets and the 
mobilization of knowledge assets that were the legacy of one of the city’s historic industrial 
strengths. 
The paper concludes with a brief consideration of the wider relevance and applicability of this 
model of bioscience based regional development. 
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Introduction 
This paper has its origins in a series of research projects undertaken by researchers at 
Nottingham Business School centred on the development of the UK’s largest and arguably 
most successful bioscience business incubator – BioCity Nottingham. Home to a large and 
growing concentration of biotechnology companies, the rise of BioCity Nottingham has come 
to symbolise Nottingham’s economic reinvention as a ‘knowledge economy’ following years 
of de-industrialisation. From its roots deep in the manufacturing dominated local economy that 
spawned ‘Saturday Night and Sunday Morning’1, we chart the rise of exactly the kind of 
knowledge intensive industrial cluster that has been an object of desire for national, regional 
and local policy makers since the Millennium and before (Swords 2013). Interesting though 
the tale of BioCity’s emergence is in its own right, the principal focus of this paper is on what 
this case can tell us about the continuing evolutions of Nottingham’s economy and the 
implications that this may have for our understanding of regional economic path creation and 
adaptive capability more generally. 
The local economy of Nottingham faced major structural changes in the late 1990s. These 
changes saw not only the demise of what had at one time been a key industrial sector (the 
manufacture of pharmaceuticals), but also the departure of two of the city’s three principal 
employers, and the closure of a major research facility owned by a third.  The case explores 
the manner in which capabilities linked to this constellation of firms were redeployed in order 
to take advantage of new market opportunities. The case places particular emphasis on the 
contribution of firms, the restructuring of industry sectors and institutional changes that 
occurred at this time, to the city’s adaptive capability. In the process the case study reveals a 
notable example of adaptation as the local economy moved away from a previous path of 
regional and sectoral development, towards a new and yet related trajectory. Central to this 
process was the purposive re-tasking of physical assets and the mobilization of knowledge 
assets that were the legacy of one of the city’s historic industrial strengths. 
The paper concludes by considering the wider relevance and applicability of this model of 
bioscience based regional development in order to assess the feasibility of replicating the 
Nottingham model elsewhere. In so doing it endeavours to isolate those factors that are ‘place 
specific’ to the city from those that have wider applicability. 
 
                                                          
1 Alan Sillitoe’s 1958 classic tale of industrial life in Nottingham. 
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Selective literature review 
Recent years have seen growing interest in evolutionary accounts of regional and local 
economic development – often associated with the New Economic Geography or the 
‘evolutionary turn in economic geography’ (see for example Boschma 2004, Martin & Sunley 
2006). Central to these perspectives on economic development are the related concepts of path 
dependency, lock-in and adaptive capability.  
Path dependency is a term that finds application in both economic geography and institutional 
perspectives in political science. It highlights the manner in which a region’s future 
development trajectory is, to an extent, constrained by history. In other words, the range of 
possible future paths of development are constrained by the products of social and economic 
history: accumulations of capital (human and physical), concentrations of expertise, productive 
infrastructure, institutional architecture etc. This is not to suggest that there is no role for human 
agency, but that the room for manoeuvre enjoyed by actors in the present is constrained by the 
products of history and the resources that represent a legacy of this development path. 
Closely associated with the concept of path dependency is the idea of lock-in – the manner in 
which a locality or region gets trapped on a path of relative or absolute decline. Often this is 
associated with the demise of a key local industry. Prior to the Millennium, Nottingham bore 
all the hallmarks of a city region trapped on just such a trajectory. Martin and Sunley (2006) 
identify three forms of lock-in: technological, dynamic institutional returns and institutional 
hysteresis. They also identify the importance of place specific factors: 
“place dependence is an important dimension of path dependence. This implies that forms of 
co-evolution in which there are mutually constitutive interactions and feedbacks between firms 
and other institutions are to some degree place-specific, and that these interactions occur 
simultaneously across several different scales.” (Martin and Sunley 2006 page 430) 
As these authors also note, the literature devotes far less attention to the means through which 
lock-in may be avoided. From a policy perspective, this is perhaps the critical question. One 
response to this question has been to focus on the factors that influence a region’s adaptive 
capability (Martin 2005). Adaptive capability referring here to the ability of a region to respond 
to shocks and take advantage of new development opportunities from wherever they appear. 
Central to this attribute is the ability to apply historic accumulations of assets or capabilities to 
new and emerging opportunities as and when they arise.  
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The advent of global recession in 2008 saw a shift in focus of research towards the determinants 
of economic resilience – in part a recognition of the extent to which impact of recession was 
spatially uneven (e.g. Martin 2012). But also in the belief that exploring the manner in which 
regions have responded to the shock of recession can generate insight into longer term patterns 
of change and continuity in regional economic development (Martin, Sunley and Tyler 2015). 
More recently there has been widespread recognition of the need to engage more fully with the 
process of path creation. Martin and Sunley (2006) had noted the problem of the failure to 
address the problem of path creation. This was a theme to which Martin returned in is Roepke 
Lecture of 2010, providing a critique of the path dependency model and the central concept of 
lock-in as privileging continuity over change (Martin 2010). This may be seen as a reaction 
against the perceived historical determinism implied by many formulations of path 
dependency. Martin’s response was to argue for a more evolutionary account – applying 
institutionalist insights from political science to the study of economic geography. 
*********************** 
Insert Figure 1, Martin 2010 
*********************** 
In different ways, we can see recent papers by Doussard and Schrock (2015) and Dawley et al 
(2015) and Bristow and Healy (2015) responding to this challenge. The former’s study of North 
American manufacturing highlights the importance of firm, technological, place and market 
level contingencies structuring uneven spatial development. In contrast, Dawley at al (2015) 
present a case study of wind power in the North East of England in which they identify regional 
policy initiatives and the multi-scalar state as fulfilling mediating functions in the creation of 
new paths of development. Bristow and Healy (2015) in turn apply a complex adaptive systems 
approach to explore the nature and scope of agency in regional development. Arguably the key 
insight that they derive from this perspective is a recognition of the importance of interaction 
between actors and the sense in which “agents are co-evolving, constantly adapting to each 
other and to their environment” (Bristow and Healy 2015, 246). 
This paper also seeks to understand the process of path creation – with a particular emphasis 
on the interaction between institutions, agents and place over time. In so doing we seek to 
identify the sources of a city region’s adaptive capability in the co-evolution of institutions, 
firms and markets. We use a simplified model of path creation that takes inspiration from the 
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Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) of John Kingdom (1995). MSF is a perspective on the 
policy process that is notable for the manner in which it conceptualises the process as 
comprising a number of parallel streams of activity that converge during particular windows 
of opportunity to effect a change of policy direction. The agency of particular ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ is seen to be critical if a ‘policy window’ is to be converted into a concrete 
change of policy. 
******************** 
Insert Figure 2: Simplified model of path creation loosely based on MSF 
******************** 
 
The appeal of MSF as a model of the policy process is the manner in which it eschews simplistic 
linear or cyclical representations of the process that represents its object of study (Rossiter and 
Price 2013). Indeed the strength of this approach is its ability to disentangle the often 
complicated and messy process that is the ‘real world’ of policy. A world in which parallel 
streams of activity happen simultaneously, sometimes independent of each other, sometimes 
interacting. These characteristics make the MSF account of policy change an interesting and 
relevant analogue for similar processes at work in the phenomenon of regional and local 
economic path creation. Central to the approach is a recognition of the importance of agency 
if policy outcomes are to be understood. Following Dawley et al (2015) and Bristow and Healy 
(2015) we see agency associated with the local implementation of regional policy as an 
important ingredient in the local ‘recipe’ that led to the creation of Nottingham’s now 
burgeoning biotech sector. 
 
Methodology 
In developing a case study of the development of the local economy in Nottingham, multiple 
sources of data were employed.  Extensive use was made of documentary and archival 
materials. The documentary materials included a variety of items from weekly and monthly 
trade magazines and periodicals, as well as the local and financial press. A number of business 
histories, industry studies and even biographies and autobiographies were also used to provide 
background data on the local economy and the development of the pharmaceutical industry in 
the region. Overall these sources provided a wealth of valuable background and technical 
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information in relation to the pharmaceutical industry in Nottingham.  The study also drew on 
previous research carried out by the authors exploring the nature of the BioCity incubator and 
analysing its growth and development, as well as other studies of the biotechnology incubator 
sector in the UK. The data gathered in this way was complemented by a small number of 
interviews with ‘key informants’ (John and Reve, 1982), including staff employed at the 
facility prior to its closure as an industrial research laboratory, at some of the agencies involved 
in negotiating and organising the transition to an incubator and at the incubator itself.. Data 
from the interviews was extremely helpful in understanding and making sense of some of 
technical aspects surrounding the activities undertaken at the laboratory facility and the key 
issues that arose in facilitating the transition. 
 
Case study: The development of Nottingham’s Bioscience cluster 
Adaptive capability and the development of Nottingham’ economy 
The city of Nottingham has a long history as centre of government and as a market town 
servicing a wide rural hinterland. However, it was with the establishment of the hosiery 
industry after 1730 that the town emerged as a major centre of manufacturing industry 
(Henstock, Dunster & Wallwork, 2006). The physical legacy of this industrial heritage is 
apparent to anyone strolling through the Lace Market area of Nottingham today – although 
most of the old textile warehouses and factories have been put to new uses in recent years. 
Textiles continued to dominate the local economy but as the nineteenth century drew to a close 
and the twentieth century advanced, new industrial sectors began to emerge. Cycle 
manufacture, tobacco and pharmaceuticals, having taken root in the closing decades of the 
nineteenth century, gradually became more significant. Two out of the three owed their location 
in the city to historical accident, but cycle maker Raleigh, founded by two textile machinery 
makers and a lace worker (Rosen, 2002), was the product of a process of industrial adaptation 
that was to re-occur throughout the city’s industrial development.  In addition the development 
of the Nottinghamshire coalfield created a demand for labour that in turn provided a 
considerable stimulus to the economy of Nottingham. 
The interwar years were marked by adaptation in the city’s textile industry itself. Textiles 
remained important, but hosiery and knitwear (Chapman, 2002) largely replaced the once 
dominant lace industry. The latter experienced a dramatic decline in the years after the first 
World War, while by 1931 there were nearly twice as many hosiery workers in Nottingham as 
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before the war (Wells, 1966), in both instances as a result of changes in fashion. Meanwhile 
the new industries, exemplified by retail chemist Boots, cycle maker Raleigh and cigarette 
manufacturer Players (Wells, 1966), continued to expand and grow. The city’s substantial stake 
in these new industries proved remarkably well adapted to the economic environment of the 
interwar years, which favoured industries producing branded consumer goods for the home 
market (Pollard,1992). The result was a significant re-shaping and diversification of 
employment in the city (Wells, 1966), as the emerging ‘big three’ employers of the twentieth 
century expanded, building major new factories in the city and taking on more staff,  the 
sectoral composition of the local economy changed. As a result, while unemployment was 
severe in the depressions of the early 1920s and 1930s, it was cyclical rather than structural 
and when conditions improved Nottingham’s industrial expansion was resumed (Wells, 1966: 
p410). 
By the middle of the twentieth century, structural change within the local economy had 
gathered pace. Economists (Wells, 1966, p405) were now able to describe Nottingham as an 
outstanding example of an economy with ‘a well-balanced employment structure’. The early 
postwar years were golden ones for Raleigh as production doubled in the 1950s to one million 
cycles a year (Chapman, 2006). Similarly Players’ cigarette sales overtook those of rival brand 
Wills in the late 1950s. At Boots profits from manufacturing, once the Cinderella of the 
business climbed to 40 per cent of turnover (Chapman, 2006), although the discovery of the 
painkiller ibuprofen by Stewart Adams in the mid-1960s failed to produce the rewards it should 
because of the company’s limited international presence.   
Nonetheless by the 1960s Boots, Raleigh and Players had become the mainstays of the local 
economy (Chapman, 2006). The city’s big employers each had nearly 10,000 employees at 
their height. The early postwar years were also marked by growth in other sectors, most notably 
engineering. Major employers by the 1960s also included Plessey/GPT in Beeston which 
employed 5,000 at one point and other major engineering concerns included Royal Ordnance 
and former textile machinery firms that had diversified into other sectors such as the Jardine 
Group producing typewriters and Manlove Alliott (Wells, 1966) making hospital equipment. 
However the 1960s was to be the zenith for two of Nottingham’s ‘big three’ employers. 
Increased car ownership combined with stiffer overseas competition saw Raleigh’s output and 
employment steadily decline despite a merger with Tube Investments and attempts at 
diversification into mopeds and motor scooters both of which proved unsuccessful (Chapman, 
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2006). Likewise Players, now part of Imperial Tobacco, though it opened a major new factory 
at Clifton on the outskirts of the city in 1971 (Chapman, 2006), was subject to a similar pattern 
of declining employment during the course of the 1970s and 1980s. The main factor was 
increasing public recognition of the health risks associated with tobacco and cigarette smoking. 
In 1981 five of Players factories were closed and some 3,000 staff made redundant (Chapman, 
2006). By the early 2000s both Raleigh and Players had ceased manufacturing operations in 
Nottingham. 
The sustained decline in manufacturing employment in Nottingham (especially in textile 
related sectors and light engineering) continued in the closing years of the twentieth century. 
In 1966 the East Midlands Study had identified Nottingham as integral to the ‘northern 
industrial belt’ an area within which employment in manufacturing and extractive industries 
stood at over 60 per cent (EMEPC 1966). By 2014 manufacturing employment in Nottingham 
stood at around 6 per cent (ESRB 2014). However this decline was largely matched by the 
growth of service sector employment and specifically business/information services, education 
and health. This has been sustained and can be said largely to have compensated for the loss of 
manufacturing employment (in volume terms at least). 
This transformation has seen particular growth in the business/information services sector with 
several large companies now based in Nottingham, including Experian, Capital One and Ikano. 
Experian is much the largest with more than 2000 employees in the city (Nottingham Post, 
2013). Unlike the other two which are the result of inward investment that brought them to 
Nottingham in the 1990s, Experian originated in Nottingham. It provides a fascinating modern 
day example of the same process of adaptation that occurred in the late nineteenth century. 
Experian began life in the early 1970s as the credit checking arm of furniture retailer Cavendish 
Woodhouse, which was part of Great Universal Stores (GUS). It was commercialised as 
Commercial Credit Nottingham (CCN) in 1980 (Nottingham Post, 2013). Through a 
combination of organic growth and acquisitions including many overseas, it grew steadily, 
continuously adding and developing its portfolio of information service, until it became one of 
Nottingham’s largest employers. Then in 2006 it was demerged from Great Universal Stores 
as Experian, immediately becoming a FTSE 100 company. 
The overall trajectory that has led Nottingham to become a city that is dominated by the service 
sector, reflects an interesting mix of capabilities that are the product of path dependency and 
speak to the historic strengths of the local economy in Nottingham (ESRB 2014). A recent 
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example of this is the city’s emerging bioscience cluster. This is a legacy of historic private 
sector strengths in pharmaceuticals (Boots), a product of the concentration of health related 
activity in the locality (e.g. the Queens Medical Centre), the growth of two large universities 
with relevant research capabilities and the uniquely successful BioCity Nottingham, business 
incubation facility housed in Boots’ former research laboratories on Pennyfoot Street in 
Nottingham.  
 
Boots and the industrial science legacy 
One of Nottingham’s big three employers by the mid-twentieth century, Boots really began the 
development of Nottingham’s industrial science base. Founded in the mid-nineteenth century, 
Jesse Boot its founder was a herbalist who lacked any formal scientific training. Despite this 
he recognized the value of science and from 1884 onwards he began employing trained 
pharmacists in his shop. But it was the outbreak of war with Germany in 1914 that proved a 
critical juncture in the firm’s development. The war quickly led to crippling shortages of many 
synthetic and other advanced pharmaceuticals following the cessation of imports from 
Germany (Corley: 2003). Faced with this Boots established a fine chemical manufacturing 
facility in 1915, employing a research team poached from Burroughs-Wellcome and over the 
next three years launched products ranging from antiseptics and anaesthetics to aspirin and 
saccharin (Corley, 2003). Boots thus placed its self on a par with the longer established 
pharmaceutical manufacturers.  
************ 
Insert Table 1 
************ 
During the inter war years Boots recruited a number of leading scientists from universities 
across Britain, to its research staff and between 1936 and 1941 it had the third highest level of 
patent filings for a UK-owned pharmaceutical company (Slinn, 2008). In the postwar era Boots 
built up a formalized research and development (R & D) programme in the 1950s and 1960s, 
becoming a major force within the UK pharmaceutical industry. Among its major achievements 
was the discovery of the widely used pain-killer ibuprofen, although the company’s lack of 
international marketing expertise meant it never produced the rewards it might. 
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However while Raleigh and Players went into decline from the 1970s Boots continued to 
prosper. Through acquisitions, including rival chemist Timothy Whites with its 600 branches, 
Boots’ retail chemist business continued to expand in the 1970s. It was a similar pattern for 
Boots’ pharmaceutical business which saw a number of important acquisitions in the 1970s 
including Crookes Laboratories and Rucker Pharmacol, and in the 1980s the Flint division of 
Baxter Tavernol (Chapman, 2006). Flint was a US company that owned synthroid, a big selling 
treatment for thyroid conditions. Thus by the mid-1980s Boots was not only the UK’s largest 
retail chemist, it was also the fifth largest pharmaceutical company in the UK (see table 1).   
But it lacked the international marketing capability of rivals like Glaxo, Wellcome and 
Beecham.  
 
In the late 1980s under a new chief executive James Blyth, who had formerly worked for the 
confectionary firm Mars, Boots attempted to diversify into other areas of retailing, in particular 
larger stores in out-of-town locations. This included the launching of the abortive Children’s 
World stores in 1987 and the acquisition for £900million in 1989 of the Ward White group 
which included the Halfords automotive parts chain, the Payless home improvement chain and 
A G Stanley’s FADS home decorating chain. At the same time Blyth engineered a re-
structuring which saw the emergence of four divisions that included Boots the Chemist, a retail 
division and Boots Pharmaceuticals. The acquisitions proved disastrous as they were followed 
by a five year depression in the UK housing market which severely cut DIY sales turning 
Boots’ Do-It-All chain (which now included Payless) and FADS into loss making operations. 
The company was also hurt by the high debt incurred in making the Ward White acquisition. 
 
In 1991 two new units were split off from Boots Pharmaceuticals. Thus while Boots 
Pharmaceuticals retained responsibility for prescription only drugs, Boots Healthcare 
International (BHI) assumed the over-the-counter (OTC) business and Boots Contract 
Manufacturing (BCM) became the company’s producer of mostly private label health and 
beauty products (Smith, 1996). By now Boots Pharmaceuticals was facing difficulties. These 
reflected its relatively small size internationally (see table 1) and problems surrounding the 
development of new drugs. In 1993, having spent 14 years and £150 million on research and 
development (Hoskings, 1993), Boots withdrew its heart drug manoplax, when new research 
showed that while it was effective in relieving the symptoms of congestive heart failure (CHF) 
it could in certain circumstances shorten life slightly.  
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It had been back in 1979 that biochemists at Boots laboratories in Nottingham first synthesized 
flosequinan, the active ingredient in manoplax. It showed early promise as a means of relieving 
congestive heart failure. By 1990 after 10 years of trials commentators were bullish about the 
prospects for manoplax. It was a crucial development for Boots, as none of its other prescription 
drugs was still under patent in the UK. Even synthroid, Boots highly profitable thyroid 
replacement therapy was out of patent and margins on it and other drugs like ibuprofen were 
shrinking (Hoskings, 1993). By the time manoplax was finally granted a licence in the UK in 
August 1992 (see table 2) it had come to be seen as ‘great white hope not only for Boots 
Pharmaceuticals, but for the wider group’ (Hoskings, 1993). Hence the impact when it finally 
flopped was all the greater. 
 
Faced with this setback, and with other parts of Boots such as Do-It-All and FADS in trouble 
and the new Children’s World chain taking much longer than expected to come good, this 
placed the future of Boots Pharmaceutical division in doubt. There were those who argued that 
Boots, ranked in 50th place in the world by size, was simply too small. 
 
With its ambitious plans for expansion into new areas of retailing having largely failed, and its 
drug development portfolio in tatters, Boots board took the decision to divest itself of the 
prescription only drug business. Thus early in 1995 the business was sold to the German 
chemical conglomerate BASF for £850 million (Green, 1994). Although Boots retained the 
over-the-counter pharmaceutical business along with contract manufacturing, the deal ended 
the company’s 80 years in the prescription drugs sector. 
 
************ 
Insert Table 2 
************ 
The attraction for BASF was that its core business of agrochemicals was highly cyclical, 
whereas pharmaceuticals were almost untouched by the business cycle. In addition BASF 
already had a modest pharmaceutical business which traded under the Knoll brand and a 
worldwide marketing network. Another attraction for BASF was that Boots had an anti-obesity 
drug, ‘at a fairly advanced stage’ (Hoskings, 1993), and this held the promise of large sales in 
the US where BASF already had a presence. However BASF’s ownership of the Boots research 
laboratories in Nottingham was to prove relatively short-lived.  
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Within four years, BASF was conducting a strategic review of its entire pharmaceutical 
operation worldwide. There were those within the company who had always found it difficult 
to see BASF as anything other than a chemical company. This was not helped by regulatory 
concerns limiting the use of reductil the anti-obesity drug developed by Boots.  In any event 
the 1990s were a tumultuous decade for the worldwide pharmaceutical industry which saw 
significant re-structuring (Owen, 1999). 
 
As a result Lehman Brothers were called in to prepare the unit for sale. While there was 
considerable interest from prospective purchasers, they tended to be more interested in the IPR 
rather than the site. Then out of the blue it was announced in December 2000 that the American 
pharmaceutical company Abbott Laboratories was to purchase the worldwide business of Knoll 
Pharmaceuticals for $6.9 billion (thepharmaletter, 2000). However there was a problem. While 
Abbott was keen to acquire the Nottingham site’s IPR which included the anti-obesity drug 
reductil, it did not want either the site itself or the staff, since its own research facilities were 
distinctly home-based and not multinational. As a result BASF was forced to make 450 highly 
qualified scientific staff in Nottingham redundant and try and find a buyer for the site itself. 
The loss of some 450 highly skilled science jobs was a major blow to the local economy. The 
redundancies came at a point when the closure of the last Raleigh manufacturing plant in 
Nottingham had recently been announced and not long after another big manufacturing plant 
in the city, Royal Ordnance owned by British Aerospace, had also closed.  
 
However disposal of the former Boots research laboratories on Pennyfoot Street in Nottingham 
was to prove somewhat problematic. Although the site was quickly put up for sale, there was 
little interest from buyers. The laboratories were modern and purpose built so were not easily 
converted to alternative uses and the site itself had limited scope for development. 
 
While BASF were casting around what to do with the site, a specialist consultancy firm, Angle 
Technologies Ltd, was commissioned to undertake a study into the feasibility of using the 
facility as a bioincubator. The impetus for this move may well have been that a number of small 
biotechnology firms including RenaSci in Nottingham  and  a Cambridge based SME did 
approach BASF about the possibility of renting laboratory facilities. 
 
When it became clear that there was little prospect of selling the site without demolishing the 
buildings and writing off the equipment, BASF took the unusual step of giving the facility 
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away. It gifted the site and the laboratory facilities to one of Nottingham’s two universities. 
Surprisingly BASF chose to gift the laboratories not to the University of Nottingham, the more 
research intensive of Nottingham’s two universities and the one that historically had stronger 
links to Boots, but to the city’s former polytechnic, Nottingham Trent University. The choice 
surprised many.  However the site was much nearer to Nottingham Trent University’s city 
centre campus and many of its technical staff had been trained there over the years. It is also 
possible that BASF wanted to be seen to be even handed since Boots had over the years been 
very generous to Nottingham University, having given the university its 300 acre University 
Park campus in the 1929. Interviews with participants in this process suggest that it was 
precisely this difference between the nature of the two universities that led key decision makers 
within BASF conclude that a gift to NTU would have the ‘greatest impact’2. 
 
Whatever the motives, in August 2001 it was formally announced that BASF had gifted the 
facility, which comprised three buildings valued at some £4 million, comprising more than 
100,000 square feet (THES, 2001) of laboratory space, to one of Nottingham Trent University. 
Spread across three buildings, the facility comprised world class laboratories and state-of-the-
art equipment. The buildings comprised a manufacturing facility for early stage clinical trials, 
together with a total of 16 medical chemistry laboratories. The facility would have cost close 
to £50 million to build and equip at current prices (Hansard, 2008).  
 
The move on BASF’s part was unprecedented. At the time it was the largest corporate donation 
ever to have been made to a post-1992 university (Hansard, 2008). The offer of the Pennyfoot 
Street laboratories when it was made in 2001 even came as a surprise to Nottingham Trent 
University’s vice chancellor, Professor Ray Cowell. 
 
Having acquired the former BASF laboratories, Nottingham Trent University had to consider 
just how to establish it and manage it as a bioincubator, especially since it was significantly 
larger than existing biotechnology incubators, bigger even than the Babraham bioincubator 
outside Cambridge.  
 
As the consultants brought in to advise observed, when it came to developing the facility, 
‘Nottingham Trent University wisely decided it needed it needed to work with partners’ 
                                                          
2 Interview with senior research scientist employed first by Boots and then BASF on the Pennyfoot Street site. 
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(Hansard, 2008). These partners included a range of supporting institutions based or operating 
in the region. As the consultants were later to report, the partners represented,  
 
‘a unique example of strong collaboration between a Regional Development Agency 
(East Midlands Development Agency), two universities (the Nottingham Trent 
University and the University of Nottingham) and a major science–based company 
(BASF plc).’ (Hansard, 2008). 
Each was able to contribute to the development of a distinctive ‘local recipe’. This recipe was 
designed to facilitate academic-industry links and putting the facility to constructive use in 
supporting local economic development. 
 
Given its size it was capable of providing a home not just for start-up firms, but for firms 
providing related support services as well.  In utilizing the facility in this way the aim, 
according to Alan Meers, Nottingham Trent University’s director of business development, 
was to have,  
‘a mixture of units coming in, including mature research and development companies, 
emerging biotechnology companies that might be at the first phase of development, and 
incubator units which will either come from universities or will want to work with 
universities’ (THES, 2001).  
Thus was borne ‘BioCity Nottingham’ a bioscience incubator designed to facilitate the 
biomedical research of universities in the region, especially at the technology-transfer stage.  
 
Quite apart from providing the facility, BASF’s contribution extended to underwriting the 
running costs of the facility until the other partners had had an opportunity to, ‘develop a robust 
business plan and secure the necessary funding’ (Hansard, 2008).   By now EMDA had the 
capability to assess possible uses for the redundant laboratories. It was also sufficiently well 
established to be able to ensure that Nottingham’s two universities, who often found themselves 
in competition both for students and academic staff, worked together for common goals. Its 
particular contribution was,  
‘a well designed and well developed regional strategy that ensured public funding 
could be made available to help BioCity get established’ (Hansard, 2008).  
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The University of Nottingham was able to contribute a very strong bioscience and healthcare 
research base.  
 
The project also benefited from the use of specialist consultants, Oxford Innovation Ltd, with 
first-hand experience of managing incubator facilities.  One such incubator was DiagnOx, at 
Upper Heyford near Oxford, was housed in re-furbished rather than purpose-built premises and 
focused on biotechnology and medical technology applications. Given their prior experience, 
the consultants were able to manage the initial operation of the BioCity facility, providing time 
for the careful recruitment and selection of a manager for the incubator with just the right mix 
of skills and experience.  
 
Thus a joint venture in which the two universities were partners along with EMDA, was set up 
with the very specific aim namely to ‘re-purpose’ the Pennyfoot Street laboratories. Under 
EMDA’s guidance it was agreed that the Pennyfoot Street laboratories should become an 
‘incubator’ specializing in embryonic life science companies. They would be housed in small 
laboratory based units and sharing common facilities and services. Some £9 million was spent 
over the next ten years to extensively refurbish and modernize the facilities. The facility was 
re-named as ‘BioCity Nottingham’ to reflect its city centre location. The first phase of the 
development was opened by the science minister, Lord Sainsbury in September 2003 (Connon, 
2003). This facility provides generic laboratory space for small biotechnology start-ups 
together with an administrative hub comprising, office space, meeting rooms, café and a 
conference room.   
 
Phase two of the incubator was launched in July 2006 with the opening of the adjacent Stewart 
Adams building, named after the Boots scientist who led the team that discovered the painkiller 
ibuprofen on the site. The development was part funded by EMDA and the Greater Nottingham 
Partnership. This additional facility provided a particular focus on medicinal chemistry and 
pharmaceutical applications, with larger laboratories. The third phase which opened in 2009 
saw the opening of the adjacent Laurus Building, provided an additional 48,000 square feet of 
space. 
 
************ 
Insert Figure 3 
************ 
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At 129,000 square feet BioCity is now the largest biotechnology incubator in the UK.  With 
the inclusion of ‘grow-on’ space in the Laurus Building it is able to accommodate a unique 
range of enterprises that includes not merely for small start-up companies larger and more 
mature ones as well.  
 
The BioCity incubator and the development of Nottingham’s bioscience cluster 
Figure 3 shows that the BioCity incubator attracted a steady stream of new tenants every year 
between 2003 and 2009. Within months of opening, the incubator had attracted five new 
tenants. In the following year, this swelled to 11 new arrivals. After peaking in 2004, the 
number of new tenants dipped markedly the following year. But as phase two came on stream 
in 2006 there was a resurgence of new arrivals. New tenants then dipped again in 2007 and 
2008, possibly reflecting the worsening financial climate, before rising with the opening of 
phase three of the incubator in September 2008. 
 
By 2009 BioCity was home to some 60 companies, covering a range of bioscience applications. 
Unlike the situation in the golden triangle regions of the East and South East, where new life 
science companies are predominantly ones focusing on purely biotechnology applications (e.g. 
new drug therapies and diagnostics), BioCity’s tenants were almost equally divided between 
biotechnology and medical technology applications. This is a pattern found in other 
‘peripheral’ regions like the North West, North East and Yorkshire and Humberside (strangely 
Scotland is alone in following the pattern found in the South East and East). This appears to be 
a function of spatial dynamics in that the golden triangle is home to the leading research 
universities (i.e. Cambridge and Oxford) and nearest the principal source of capital (i.e. 
London). In the East Midlands it also seems likely that this reflects the location of major 
medical institutions such as the Queens Medical Centre in Nottingham. A similar pattern is 
evident in the United States where Feldman and Francis (2003) found medical technology 
applications were important outside the leading biotechnology regions like California and 
Massachusetts.  
 
Many of the new tenants arriving in the early years were existing biotechnology companies. 
Figure 4 shows that in the first couple of years, there was little additionality in terms of new 
jobs created. However this quickly changed. In 2005 some 30 new jobs were created in the 
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incubator, rising to 70 in 2006 and almost 150 in 2007. Although the recession slowed 
employment growth (see figure 4), nonetheless by 2008 employment within the facility had 
risen to almost 400.  
************ 
Insert Figure 4 
************ 
 
Clearly these weren’t all new jobs as some tenant companies weren’t newly created and were  
already employing staff when they moved into the incubator. The arrival of tenants who were 
already employing staff meant that jobs were effectively being displaced from elsewhere.  In 
all 118 jobs were displaced in this way. Nonetheless, over the period to 2008 additional job 
creation amounted to 278 out of a total of 396, an average of 46.3  per year. Hence during its 
first six years of operation the incubator had a significant direct impact on the city of 
Nottingham in terms of job creation, especially since the majority of new jobs created were 
science based. What is also apparent from figure 4 is that job creation, took time to get going. 
In the early period employment growth through displacement greatly outweighed growth 
through new job creation. There was a distinct lag between firms setting up in the incubator 
and new jobs being created. This lag would appear to be a function of the new venture creation 
process with a ‘settling in’ period following formation or transfer to the incubator, during which 
firms organise and establish their activities. 
 
Of the 60 companies located at BioCity by 2009, 39 were generic biotechnology companies 
(the remainder provided a range of support services such as patent agents, that would otherwise 
have been missing in a nascent cluster).  Just over one third (38.5 per cent) of the generic 
biotechnology companies, comprising 15 companies, were utilising a ‘product’ (i.e. drug 
discovery) business model, based on what Pisano (2006) terms ‘the monetization of intellectual 
property’ (IP). With this business model the company aims to capitalise on a scientific 
breakthrough by patenting it and then either licencing it or selling it to a third party with the 
resources to commercialise it. This requires the company to bear significant risks because of 
potential problems in the development process. It is also expensive because large investments 
in R & D may be required before there is any kind of financial return. An example of a BioCity 
tenant company utilizing this model is Regentec Ltd, a spin-out company from the School of 
Pharmacy at the University of Nottingham that is working in the field of regenerative medicine 
18 
 
(Smith and Ehret, 2013). Regentec specializes in orthopaedic applications and has grown to 
the point where it has 15 employees and has filed 4 patents.  
 
In contrast, nearly two thirds (61.5 per cent) comprising 24 companies at BioCity, were using 
a ‘service’ business model. With this business model companies are not seeking to 
commercialise IP but instead focus on the provision of a range of specialised research services 
that typically facilitate the new product development process of third parties (Kasabov and 
Delbridge, 2008). These research services, often based on the possession of specialised tacit 
knowledge or cumulative experience and expertise, include: outsourced R & D services, quality 
management and testing, and data handling and storage.  The service business model offers a 
very different risk reward profile. It typically requires a much smaller upfront investment and 
revenues begin much earlier and are more predictable. The downside is that the chances of a 
big breakthrough leading to a huge capital gain are much less. Sygnature Chemical Services 
Ltd is an example of a BioCity company using a service business model. It was founded at 
BioCity in 2004 by a medicinal chemist with extensive pharmaceutical industry experience. 
Sygnature undertakes specific elements of the drug discovery process and is able to offer 
expertise in medicinal chemistry, synthetic chemistry, arrays/focused libraries and 
computational chemistry. Outsourcing for pharmaceutical companies forms a major feature of 
its work. Sygnature has grown rapidly and now employs 31 staff. 
 
Another feature of the profile of BioCity companies is that the proportion of companies using 
a service business model seems to be increasing. Figure 3 shows the mix of new tenants arriving 
in the incubator on a year by year basis, in terms of their business model. Although one cannot 
be precise, the general pattern seems to show that in later years the proportion of companies 
coming into the incubator with a service business model has increased. This may well reflect 
significant changes in the commercial environment in particular greater use of outsourcing and 
open innovation.  
************ 
Insert Table 3 
************ 
 
The significance of the BioCity incubator in terms of the development of bioscience in 
Nottingham can be gauged from a recent survey which looked at new bioscience companies 
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formed between 2005 and 2011. The results compare the distribution of new companies formed 
in an incubator with those formed outside such a facility. In the case of the East Midlands only 
a tiny proportion were formed outside an incubator with a very much bigger proportion within 
an incubator. Since BioCity in Nottingham is the only bioincubator in the region one may 
conclude that its opening in 2003 has had a powerful impact on the growth and development 
sector of this sector and the emergence of a bioscience cluster in Nottingham. Many of these 
firms were the product of the region’s research base, specifically the universities located in the 
region. Table 3 shows that about a third of the new firms located in the incubator were 
university spin-outs. Not unsurprisingly the chief source of these spin-outs was Nottingham 
University which was the source of seven of the thirteen companies shown in table one, 
although Nottingham Trent University contributed as did Leicester University. What is perhaps 
surprising is that the incubator was even able to draw in a small number of spin-offs from as 
far afield as Cambridge and Oxford universities.  
 
Case Analysis: A new development path emerges in Nottingham 
From the case study it is evident that a new development path, based on bioscience and health, 
has emerged in Nottingham in the last couples of decades. The most obvious symbol of this 
new development path is the bioscience cluster centred on the BioCity incubator and 
comprising more than 70 bioscience related companies established in Nottingham since 2000. 
Another symbol was the designation of Nottingham by the UK government in May 2005, as 
one of six ‘Science Cities’ (Charles, 2015). The designation of these cities was based on the 
presence of ‘high performing universities and research establishments’ that can contribute to 
attracting ‘a critical mass of knowledge-based businesses’ (HM Treasury, 2004). Nottingham’s 
designation reflected the city’s scientific achievements (i.e. the discovery of the painkiller 
ibuprofen at Boots in the 1960s), the quantity and quality of its scientific institutions and the 
strength of science-based sectors within the local economy. It also reflected increasing 
recognition of the BioCity incubator’s success as one of the largest biotechnology incubators 
in the UK. Another symbol was the East Midland Development Agency’s (EMDA) selection 
in its Regional Economic Strategy, entitled ‘A flourishing region’ (EMDA, 2006), of 
bioscience/health as one of four priority sectors predicted to, ‘make the greatest contribution 
to the East Midlands economy over the lifetime of the strategy’. Similarly when in 2012 
Nottingham City Council published its contribution to local economic development in the form 
of the Nottingham Growth Plan (Nottingham City Council, 2012), this explicitly recognized 
recent changes in the city’s economy by specifically identifying life sciences as a ‘growth 
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sector’ in which the city had a ‘competitive advantage’ and including it as one of just three 
sectors prioritized in terms of their potential contribution to the development and growth of the 
city economy.  
 
Given that bioscience has emerged as a new development path in Nottingham, this raises the 
important question of just how this has come about. On the basis of this case study, it is 
tempting to suggest that it is simply a matter of serendipity, that is the product of a series of 
chance events of which perhaps the most notable were Abbott Laboratories wish to purchase 
Knoll Pharmaceuticals’ IPR but not the Nottingham site where it was developed, and the 
decision by Knoll’s parent company BASF, to gift the Nottingham site to one of the city’s 
universities. However putting it down to serendipity is highly simplistic and ignores strong 
elements of path dependency revealed when we consider the wider economic and institutional 
context within which this development occurred. 
 
Using the model of path creation developed earlier (figure 2), there appear in this case to be 
three parallel yet inter-acting and co-evolving strands of development that ultimately brought 
about a unique ‘window of opportunity’ for Nottingham at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. Importantly these strands also interacted to provide the capability necessary to take 
advantage of an opportunity that they were implicated in creating. 
 
*************** 
Insert Figure 6: The development of biotech in Nottingham 
*************** 
 
The first stream of activity operated at the industry level, where the 1990s saw a decade of 
industry concentration fuelled by successive mergers (See table 4). Underlying this process of 
concentration were a number of factors. Foremost was the rising cost of drug development, 
with leading firms spending 15%-18% of their turnover on research and development (R & D), 
with a new drug taking at least 10 years to develop at a cost of $250-$350 to develop (Collett, 
2000). Other factors included an over-dependence in some companies on a single blockbuster 
drug and the need for critical mass in both R & D and marketing.  
 
At the same time as concentration was taking place, changes were occurring in the model of R 
& D used by many pharmaceutical companies. With the rise of the biotechnology sector 
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(Pisano (2006), small firms were increasingly able to provide both potential new drugs and a 
range of research services. Across the UK the number of small specialist biotechnology 
companies doubled beween 1994 and 1999 (DTI, 1999). As a result there was a gradual move 
away from what Chesbrough (2006: p51) describes as, ‘the traditional paradigm of R & D’, as 
pharmaceutical companies increasingly embraced open innovation. Hence the industry 
landscape evolved rapidly during the 1990s. Boots was in no way isolated from these changes 
to the structure of the global pharmaceuticals industry. The concentration of the global 
pharmaceuticals sector and intensified competition for Boots created a problem to which the 
Boots leadership had to respond. The industry wide shift towards ‘open innovation’ in the 
development of new treatments also created a market opportunity for exactly the kinds of 
biotech firms that would later come to occupy BioCity. 
 
The second stream operated at the firm level and in this case centred on Boots and its 
pharmaceutical division. As the case study has outlined Boots evolved from a retail chemist to 
a national player in pharmaceuticals and ultimately one with international ambitions, over the 
course of 80 years. In research terms by the 1990s it had a potentially valuable drug 
development pipeline. Its most notable success had been the discovery of the painkiller 
ibuprofen, but there were others including synthroid and sibutramine, though the company’s 
lack of international marketing skills, meant none realised their full potential as a blockbuster 
drug. Consequently Boots had remained a national rather than an international player. Then a 
combination of regulatory problems surrounding its heart drug manoplax, combined with 
leadership changes that brought in a strong retail focus, led to the company divesting its 
pharmaceutical division. The purchaser, BASF, then ran into regulatory problems with a new 
drug itself and with a wave of mergers driving many pharmaceutical companies to seek further 
acquisitions, it too took the decision to divest. However this time the purchaser wanted the IPR 
but not the Nottingham site or its research staff. Unable to sell the site, BASF chose instead to 
gift it to one of the city’s universities, thereby creating a unique window of opportunity. This 
development both freed a key economic asset for redeployment (the Pennyfoot Street 
laboratory site) and created a pool of highly specialised research scientists who were displaced. 
The question was, to what new purpose could the site and this pool of related human capital  
be put? 
 
The third strand comprised the development of local institutions, including particular scientific 
ones. Chief among these public sector anchor institutions was the Queens Medical Centre 
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(QMC) opened in 1977 following the creation of a new Medical School at the University of 
Nottingham in 1970. The QMC was the first purpose-built teaching hospital to be constructed 
in the UK. As such it constituted a significant addition to the City’s science base.  Currently 
the main acute hospital for the East Midlands region QMC employs nearly 6,000 staff and until 
very recently was the largest hospital in the UK and the largest teaching hospital in Europe. 
The advent of the QMC helped the City to generate ‘critical mass’ in health related biosciences. 
It also created a ready market for the kind of health related bioscience companies adopting the 
services business model that is such a notable feature of the companies resident at BioCity. 
 
Other important public sector anchor institutions that form part of the city’s science base 
included its two universities. From their earliest years both had close contact with local 
industry.  Nottingham’s University College finally gained its charter to become a full university 
in 1948 having acquired a large new 300 acre campus two miles south west of the city in the 
interwar years, through the generosity of Boots founder, who had originally planned to use the 
site for a Cadbury-style model community (Chapman, 1974).  From this point onwards 
Nottingham University developed into one of the UK’s leading research intensive universities, 
with major departments in bioscience and healthcare (see figure 5) and rated a, ‘leading 
biotechnology research university’ in terms of funding support from the relevant UK research 
councils.  A measure of the university’s rise among the scientific community was its first Nobel 
prize in 2003 awarded to Sir Peter Mansfield for his work on Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(Ehret et al., 2012). The city’s polytechnic, which had for a long time played an important role 
in training technicians and laboratory staff working in local companies like Boots, merged with 
the city’s college of education in 1975 and gained independence from local authority control 
in 1992 when it became Nottingham Trent University (NTU). 
 
The development of Nottingham’s two universities and their relation to local industry is itself 
noteworthy and provides evidence of co-evolution. Indeed, in different ways the development 
of both universities may be seen as directly stimulated by local industry. The philanthropy of 
Jesse Boot played a key role in the development of the University of Nottingham, just as the 
needs of local manufacturing firms had stimulated the creation of NTU’s earliest antecedent – 
a college of arts in the 1840s. To this extent both universities can be regarded as products of a 
particular industrial milieu. That both universities later came to play significant roles in the 
creation of a new biotech development path is suggestive of an intriguing symmetry. In 
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different ways the development of both universities can be seen as having been ‘seeded’ by 
local industries and industrialists. 
 
Other important institutional developments locally included the award unitary status to 
Nottingham City Council in 1998. The significance of this was to increase the authority’s 
influence over and resources devoted to strategic planning, transport and economic 
development. The following year saw another important institutional development, the 
establishment of regional development agencies (RDAs) across the UK, including the East 
Midlands Development Agency (EMDA) based in Nottingham. EMDA was part of the actor 
network associated with attempts to implement cluster policies under the then New Labour 
government (Swords, 2013). However they were also important actors in economic 
development at the local level, especially since they had substantial funds at their disposal. By 
accident of location, it is also noteworthy that EMDA’s main offices in Nottingham overlooked 
the Pennyfoot Street laboratory site – meaning that the site and its potential future use could 
hardly fail to be prominent in the minds of key EMDA executives. 
Even so while the opportunity might have emerged, the path itself was far from clear at the 
time. But into this space came a relatively new but important institutional actor (or institutional 
enabler in figures 2 & 6), namely the local RDA. EMDA’s distinctive contribution to the local 
recipe was to facilitate the establishment of a collaborative joint venture comprising the two 
universities and EMDA. This entailed encouraging two often competing universities to work 
together for their mutual benefit. EMDA also had a remit from the then Department for Trade 
and Industry to implement regional cluster policies. To this the Agency could also add a level 
of financial resources commensurate with the task of re-purposing the Pennyfoot Street 
laboratories. 
Hence when BASF took the decision to sell Knoll Pharmaceuticals to Abbott Laboratories in 
2000, in a deal that included the Nottingham site’s intellectual capital (i.e. its IPR), but not its 
physical assets or the human capital , all three of the strands in figure 2 converged. By so doing 
they created what was potentially a unique window of opportunity. Had the site become 
available ten years earlier or ten years later it is much less certain that local institutions would 
have had the capability or resources required to take advantage of the opportunity. Through 
these three co-evolving strands a new window of opportunity emerged alongside the 
institutional capability required to take advantage.  
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Concluding Discussion – of agency and agencies 
The case of Nottingham and the creation of a new bioscience development path in this way 
raises a number of important questions. In particular is it place specific or is it capable of wider 
replication? Aspects of the Nottingham recipe would seem to be present elsewhere. It is notable 
that similar biotechnology incubators have now been developed at other locations where 
pharmaceutical companies have closed research laboratories – often explicitly based on the 
BioCity Nottingham model. Examples include BioPark Herts developed at laboratories vacated 
by Roche and BioCity Glasgow developed from laboratories once owned and operated by 
Merck. This should be no surprise given the character of the concentration, intensification of 
competition and shift to ‘open innovation’ that marked the global pharmaceuticals sector in the 
closing decades of the twentieth century. This was a global phenomenon that impacted on many 
firms and the localities in which they were based. 
It is however at the firm and the institutional levels that we start to see the emergence of a more 
place specific set of contingencies that, with the considerable benefit of hindsight, we can say 
led to the creation of a unique window of opportunity in Nottingham circa 2000/2001. It is here 
too that we see the evolution, in the interplay between firms, administrative and scientific 
institutions, of the capabilities necessary to take advantage of the opportunity. We also see the 
emergence of specialised and localised markets for scientific labour and services of direct 
relevance to the kinds of biotech businesses attracted to Nottingham and BioCity after 2001. 
Equally important is the role of agency – individual, corporate and institutional. From Jesse 
Boot’s philanthropy to the extraordinary gift of a fully equipped industrial laboratory and trial 
drug manufacturing facility by BASF– key decisions by individuals and company boards 
shaped both the problem faced by Nottingham (losing pharmaceuticals manufacture) and the 
availability of specific assets that could be redeployed to take advantage of a new local and 
global opportunity.  
Finally we must note the key role played by EMDA – itself a product of national Government’s 
regional policy – as both a new institutional player on the ground in Nottingham and a source 
of resources and expertise that would prove critical in establishing the new biotech related 
development path. This was rooted in Nottingham’s history of industrial science and centred 
on the Pennyfoot Street laboratory. 
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Table 1 
UK-owned Pharmaceutical companies, 1982 
UK 
Ranking 
Company Pharmaceutical 
sales (£m) 
Pharmaceuticals 
% Total sales 
World 
ranking 
1. Glaxo 990.0 88.0% 18th 
2. ICI 839.0 7.0% 23rd 
3. Wellcome 837.0 80.0% 24th 
4. Beacham 782.0 31.3% 25th 
5.  Boots 399.0 16.0% 42nd 
6. Fisons 206.0 36.0% 66th 
Source: Owen (1999) 
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Table 2 
Chronology of Manoplax development 
Year Month Action 
1979 July Synthesis of BTS49465 
1980 March Animal tests start 
1982 September Tested on volunteers 
1983 October Clinical trial certificate 
1983 November Used in heart failures 
1984 December Approval inquiry starts 
1985 May UK Phase 2 dosage trials 
1990 July Phase 3 safety trials 
1991 October US heart panel approval 
1992 August License granted in UK 
1992 September Sent to UK doctors 
1992 December Licence granted in USA 
1993 March Launched in USA 
1993 April Warning on dosages 
1993 July Manoplax withdrawn 
 
Source: Hoskings (1993) 
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Table 3 
University spin-off companies at BioCity 
 Company Description Start  University  Business 
model 
1. CellAura Ltd Produces fluorescent agonists and antagonists 
for use in molecular pharmacology and 
imaging at the single cell level 
2003 Nottingham Service 
2. CompanDX 
Ltd 
Utilizeses a range of proteomic genomic 
bioinformatics technologies to enable the 
discovery of novel biomarkers 
2008 Nottingham 
Trent 
Service 
3. Critical 
Pharmaceutic
als Ltd 
Developing proprietary drug delivery 
technologies for injectable sustained release 
drugs 
2004 Nottingham Product 
 
4. CrossGen Ltd Developing microarrays using genome 
hybridization technology for species without 
sequenced genomes 
2005 Nottingham Service 
5. Eminate Ltd Designs commercial applications of micro and 
nano particles, coatings and powders 
2006 Nottingham Product 
 
6. Haemostatix 
Ltd 
Developing a protein based products to 
prevent or control different forms of bleeding 
2003 Leicester Product 
 
7. Monica 
Healthcare 
Ltd 
Developing wearable devices utilizing wireless 
technologies for use in obstetric applications  
2005 Nottingham Product 
 
8. Oxtox Ltd Developing a drug sensor that uses a novel 
technology to detect whether a person is 
under the influence of drugs 
2006 Nottingham Product 
 
9. Pharminox 
Ltd 
Developing novel small molecule drugs for use 
in the treatment of cancer 
2002 Oxford Product 
10. Promethean 
Particles Ltd 
Develops and manufactures bespoke 
nanoparticles for use in a range of industries 
2008 Oxford Service 
11. q-flo Ltd Commercialising a continuous process to 
manufacture yarns of carbon nanotubes  
n/a Cambridge Product 
12. RegenTec Ltd Produces injectable scaffolds for use in 
regenerative medicine 
2001 Nottingham Product 
 
13. X-Link Ltd Developing applications of the 
transglutaminase family of enzymes for 
wound healing and scar management 
2000 Nottingham 
Trent 
Product 
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Source: Ehret, McDonald-Junor and Smith (2012) 
 
Table 4 
Mergers and acquisitions in pharmaceuticals, 1989-2000 
Year Companies Countries 
1989 Dow/Marion US/US 
 Bristol-Myers/Squibb US/US 
 SmithKline/Beecham US/UK 
1990 Rhône-Poulenc/Rorer France/US 
 Roche/Genentech Switzerland/US 
1994 SmithKline Beecham/Sterling Health UK/US 
 BASF/Boots Germany/UK 
 American Home Products/ American Cynamid US/US 
 El Sanofi/Sterling Drug France/US 
 Roche/Syntex Switzerland/US 
1995 Glaxo/Wellcome UK/UK 
 Hoescht/Marion Merrell Dow Germany/US 
 Pharmacia/Upjohn Sweden/US 
 Rhône-Poulenc/Fisons France/UK 
1996 Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz Switzerland/Switzerland 
1997 Roche/Boehringer Switzerland/Germany 
1999 Hoescht/ Rhône-Poulenc Germany/France 
 Astra/Zeneca Sweden/UK 
2000 Glaxo Wellcome/SmithKline Beecham UK/UK 
 Pfizer/Warner-Lambert US/US 
 
Source: Owen (1999)  
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Figure 1: Towards an alternative path dependence model of local industrial evolution 
(Martin 2010, 21) 
 
 
Figure 2 Simplified model of path creation loosely based on MSF 
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Figure 3 New Tenants at the BioCity Nottingham incubator (per year) 
 
Source: Smith and Ehret (2013) 
 
Figure 4 Annual employment growth at the BioCity Nottingham incubator 
 
 Source: Smith and Ehret (2013) 
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Figure 5 
Location of research centres of excellence relating to biotechnology 
 
 
DTI (1999) 
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Figure 6 
The development of biotech in Nottingham 
 
 
 
